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Barry: Mandated Reporter Protections: Missing in Georgia

ARTICLES
MANDATED REPORTER PROTECTIONS:
MISSING IN GEORGIA
Micah Barry*
ABSTRACT

Every state and territory in the United States, including Georgia,
requires certain individuals to report suspected child abuse. In Georgia,
mandated reporters are not protected from employment retaliation. This
creates the potential for a mandated reporter to have to choose between
criminal charges for failing to report suspected child abuse or losing their
job and having a termination on their record. Protection for mandated
reporters would require a new statute or amendment of a current statute.
An examination of jurisdictions that provide employment protections
provides inspiration for how Georgia legislators could protect mandated
reporters who keep children safe.
INTRODUCTION

Every state and territory in the United States requires certain
individuals to report suspected child abuse.1 Some states require all
citizens to report suspected child abuse, but most only require specific
individuals and/or institutions to report.2 In Georgia, only certain
* Principal, The Law Office of Micah Barry; Of Counsel, The Kirby G. Smith Law Firm, LLC; Ph.D.
anticipated 2021, University of Georgia College of Education; J.D. 2014, University of Toledo
College of Law; B.A. 2010 The Ohio State University.
1.
SERVS.,

Child Welfare Info. Gateway, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE. AND NEGLECT 2 (2016), https://

www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/manda.pdf.
2. See id. at 2; see also Leonard G. III Brown & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of
Abuse: A Historical Perspective on the Evolution of States' Current Mandatory Reporting Laws With
a Review of the Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 37, 57-

58,61(2013).
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statutorily-identified individuals and institutions are mandated reporters.3
Despite requiring certain people to make these reports, Georgia does not
offer employment protection to prevent retaliation in the event that a
supervisor, politician, or business owner has some connection to the
person reported for suspected child abuse. 4 This can present a strong
disincentive from filing reports and, as a result, place children in danger
unnecessarily.
Part I of this paper will introduce mandated reporters and required
reports. Part II will examine general statutory protections for mandated
reporters. Part III will examine the lack of meaningful employment
protections and possible employment protections for reporters. Part IV
will examine possible avenues of changing Georgia law to protect
reporters, including portions of the Georgia Code that may require
amendment and examples of protections from other states and territories.
I.

A.

MANDATED REPORTERS AND MANDATORY REPORTS: THE
BASICS

The Statutes

Georgia's mandatory reporting law is spread across three statutes.5
The primary statute is title 19, chapter 7, article 1 of the Georgia Code,
titled "Reports by physicians, treating personnel, institutions and others
as to child abuse; failure to report suspected child abuse." 6 This is often
cited as the mandatory reporter statute or mandated reporter. 7 It is often
cited as the statute because it provides almost the entirety of the law
concerning mandated reporters and mandated reports.'
In addition to the primary statute, the General Assembly passed title
16, chapter 12, article 3, part 2 of the Georgia Code, which adds an
additional class of mandated reporters.9 The General Assembly also
3. Child Welfare Info. Gateway, supra note 1, at 2.
4. Id. at 3 (noting how Georgia is absent from the list of seventeen states that haver
employment protections).

5.
6.
7.

See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-5 (West 2019), 16-12-100 (West 2017), 49-5-41 (West 2020).
See id. § 19-7-5.
See, e.g., Williams v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 181 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1119 (N.D. Ga. 2016)

(referring to the statute as "The 'mandatory reporter' statute"); see also Matthew Johnson, Note,
Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Laws in Georgia: Strengthening Protection for Georgia's

Children, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 643, 657 (2015) (referring to the statute as "The Mandated Reporter
Law"). For the purposes of this paper, the terminology will be "mandatory report" and "mandated
reporter."

8. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(c)(1).
9. See id. § 16-12-100(c).
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supplemented confidentiality obligations and protections in title 49,
chapter 5, article 2 of the Georgia Code. 10 The statutes will be discussed
in more detail in the appropriate sections.
B. Reporters
In states that specifically enumerate classes of mandated reporters,
these reporters are typically professionals who work with children." As
a result of education, training, or sheer time spent working with children,
these professionals are uniquely poised to detect signs of abuse or
exploitation.12 Because of their heightened ability to spot child abuse or
neglect, the law imposes upon mandated reporters the duty to report when
they reasonably suspect that a child is being abused, neglected, or
exploited."
Georgia is considered below average regarding how many classes of
individuals are considered mandated reporters.14 Title 19, chapter 7,
article 1 of the Georgia Code lists the following as mandated reporters:
(A) Physicians licensed to practice medicine, physician assistants,
interns, or residents;
(B) Hospital or medical personnel;
(C) Dentists;
(D) Licensed psychologists and persons participating in internships to
obtain licensing pursuant to [Georgia's Code regulating psychologists
as a profession];
(E) Podiatrists;

§ 49-5-41(g)(3)(A).

10.

See id.

11.

See Andrew Solomon, Preventing Recurrences of the Cover-ups at Penn State & Baylor

(andnow Michigan State): Where Does it End, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 379, 405 (2018); see also
Victor I. Vieth, Passoverin Minnesota: Mandated Reporting and the Unequal Protection of Abused

Children, 24 WM. MICHELL L. REv. 131, 135 (1998).
12. See Emily L. Evett, Casenote, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: GeorgiaSupreme CourtNarrows
Requirementsfor MandatoryReporters in May v. State, 66 MERCER L. REv. 837, 843 (2015).

13.
14.

See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5; see also Solomon, supra note 11, at 405-406.
See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 2, at 61-62.
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(F) Registered professional nurses or licensed practical nurses... or
nurse's aides;
(G) Professional counselors, social workers, or marriage and family
therapists [licensed under Georgia law];
(H) School teachers;
(I) School administrators;
(J) School counselors, visiting teachers, school social workers, or
[certified school psychologists];
(K) Child welfare agency personnel [ ];
(L) Child-counseling personnel;
(M) Child service organization personnel;
(N) Law enforcement personnel; or

(O) Reproductive health care facility or pregnancy resource center
15
personnel and volunteers.
Although the list is long, it essentially boils down to medical
professionals, school personnel, and law enforcement/investigatory
personnel. "School" is defined to include all public and private primary,
secondary, and post-secondary educational institutions. 6 In addition to
those mandated reporters enumerated in the primary statute, Georgia's
statute criminalizing sexual exploitation of minors and possession of child
pornography mandates reports by those who "process[ ] or produc[e]
visual or printed matter either privately or commercially" (hereinafter
"photo processors")." As will be discussed below, photo processors have
a modified reporting process, which is likely why they are included in a
separate statute.
While Georgia does not compel everyone to report abuse, it enables
them to report abuse through official channels if they see it or reasonably

15. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(c)(1).
16. See id. § 19-7-5(b)(9).
17. See id. § 16-12-100(c) (West 2017).
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suspect it has occurred. 18 Individuals who are not mandated reporters
but who report abuse anyway - are often called "permissive reporters."

9

C. Reports
1.

When Reports Must Be Made

Whenever a mandated reporter "has reasonable cause to believe" that
child abuse has occurred, they must make a report. 20 The reporter must
make a report "immediately, but in no case later than 24 hours from the
time there is reasonable cause to believe that suspected child abuse has
occurred." 21 In Georgia, "child abuse" is defined as:
(A) Physical injury or death inflicted upon a child by a parent or
caretaker [excluding accidents and physical discipline that does not
cause injury];
(B) Neglect or exploitation of a child by a parent or caretaker thereof;
(C) Endangering a child;
(D) Sexual abuse of a child; or
22
(E) Sexual exploitation of a child.

Photo processors incur a duty to report when they reasonably believe
that they have encountered "visual or printed matter" that "depicts a minor
engaged in sexually explicit content."23
In 2014, the Georgia Supreme Court narrowed the requirement that
mandated reporters make a report whenever they reasonably believe that
child abuse has occurred. 24 In May v. State, a teacher in a Cherokee
County high school discovered that a student who had recently transferred
to a new school in Fulton County had engaged in a sexual relationship
with a paraprofessional at the Cherokee County school while she was

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. § 19-7-5(d).
See Child Welfare Info. Gateway, supranote 1, at 2.
See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-5(c)(1)-(2), 16-12-100(c).
Id. § 19-7-5(e).
Id. § 19-7-5(b)(4).
Id. § 16-12-100(c).
Evett, supra note 12, at 847.
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enrolled there.25 The sexual relationship the student disclosed constituted
sexual abuse under the statute. 26 The student was no longer at the school,
and the teacher did not report the paraprofessional. 27 When law
enforcement were alerted to the sexual abuse, they also discovered that
the teacher had failed to report the paraprofessional. 28 The teacher was
then charged with a misdemeanor for violating the mandated reporter
statute. 29 The case made its way to the Georgia Supreme Court, who ruled
that the reporting requirement "is limited to the abuse of a child to whom
the reporter 'attends pursuant to her duties."'3 0 Because the student had
already left the school by the time the teacher discovered the abuse, the
teacher was therefore under no duty to report. 31
The next year, the Georgia General Assembly amended the mandated
reporter statute. 32 The General Assembly did not increase the duty to
report to cover all minors, instead adding abuse by anyone who also
"attends to a child pursuant to such person's duties as an employee of or
33
volunteer at a hospital, school, social agency, or similar facility."
Following this amendment, a mandated reporter must report suspected
child abuse when (1) the reporter works with the child in the course of the
reporter's employment; or (2) when the suspected abuse involves
someone who came into contact with the child by virtue of their
employment or volunteer work at a hospital, school, social agency or
similar facility.3 4
2.

What Goes Into a Report

A report must contain the name, address, and age of the child, to the
best knowledge of the reporter.3 5 A report must also include the names
and addresses of the child's parents or caregivers. 36 The nature and extent
of the child's injuries must be in the report as well, and certain mandated
reporters that work in hospitals, physician offices, law enforcement, and

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

May v. State, 761 S.E.2d 38, 40 (Ga. 2014).
See id. at 39 n.3; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(b)(4)(E).
May, 761 S.E.2d at 39.
Id.
See id. at 40; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(h).
May, 761 S.E.2d at 45 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 45-46.
H.B. 268, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(c)(3).
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(c).
Id. § 19-7-5(e).
Id. § 19-7-5(e)(2).
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schools are authorized to take pictures of the child's injuries without
parental permission.37 Finally, the report should contain any other
information that "might be helpful in establishing the cause of the injuries
and the identity of the perpetrator." 38 In order to meet the timing
requirements, a reporter can make an initial oral report and follow up with
a written report. 39
Photo processors do not have statutorily specified requirements for
the content of their reports; they are simply required to make a report.4 0
This makes sense. The photo processor is unlikely to know the child or
customer or have the information other mandated reporters would
possess.4 1
3.

How Reports Are Made

Georgia is one of 18 states, along with DC and the US Virgin Islands,
to set forth a chain of reporting. 42 The processes in reporting follow the
hierarchy reflected in Chart 1.43

37. Id. Information about and evidence of injuries includes past injuries as well as current
injuries. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. §16-12-100(c) (West 2017).
41. See id.; see also Symposium, Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: The White-Collar Police
Force: "Duty to Report" Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 3, 15
(2002) (listing various types of required reporters by profession grouped into categories following
two basic statutory patterns).

42. See Child Welfare Info. Gateway, supra note 1, at 3.
43. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-12-100(c), 19-7-5(c)(2)-(3).
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Chart 1: The Chain of Reporting
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Photo processors have the simplest reporting structure; they report
directly to law enforcement.44 Other reporters have a slightly more
complicated procedure.45 A normal reporter must report to "the person in
charge of [the] hospital, school, agency, or facility" in which the reporter
works.46 If a reporter discovers that the abuser works at a "hospital,
school, social agency, or similar facility," the reporter must notify the
47
person in charge of the abuser's employer. The person in charge could
be a principal, dean, department head, business owner, manager, or
someone in a similar position.4 8 The person in charge of an institution
subject to mandatory reporting may delegate responsibilities to someone
49
else, such as a compliance officer or human resources representative.
For ease of reference, I will refer to the person in charge or the designated
officer as the "institutional reporter."
Once an initial report has been made to the institutional reporter, the
institutional reporter must contact the Division of Family and Child
50
Services (hereinafter "DFACS") at the Department of Human Services.
The institutional reporter is forbidden from "exercis[ing] any control,
restraint, or modification or mak[ing] any other change[s] to the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.

§ 16-12-100(c).

Id. § 19-7-5(c)(1)-(3).
Id. § 19-7-5(c)(2).
Id. § 19-7-5(c)(3).
Id. § 19-7-5(c)(2)-(3).
Id.
Id. § 19-7-5(e).
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information provided by the reporter." 51 DFACS screens reports, and
those it "has reasonable cause to believe" or those which are substantiated
by submitted evidence are reported to law enforcement or prosecutors. 2

II.

EXISTING PROTECTIONS

The mandatory reporting statutes contain some protections for

reporters, both mandated and permissive.53 Two of these protections
include: immunity and confidentiality.54 Each will be detailed below.
A.

Immunity

The mandatory reporting statute provides civil and criminal
immunity for good faith reports.55 Along with many other states, Georgia
provides immunity to permissive reporters as well as mandatory
reporters. 56 This means a reporter is generally not liable for the
consequences of reporting potential child abuse.57 Immunity attaches
when either: (1) there is reasonable cause to suspect abuse (an objective
test); or (2) the reporter had a good faith belief that they were obligated to
make a report (a subjective test).5 8 Immunity applies even when the
concern of abuse is not substantiated.59 Immunity is intended to
encourage reporters to err on the side of reporting and place investigative
duties onto DFACS and law enforcement, rather than requiring mandated
reporters, such as doctors or teachers, to fully investigate concerns
themselves.6 0
B.

Confidentiality

Reports of child abuse and statements connected to those reports are
generally not subject to public inspection under Georgia's Open Records

51. Id. § 19-7-5(c)(2)-(3).
52. Id. § 19-7-5(2).
53. Child Welfare Info. Gateway, supra note 1, at 2.
54. Id. at 4; see also Johnson, supranote 7, at 657.
55. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-110(c) (West 2017).
56. Id. § 19-7-5(f) (West 2019); see also Seletha R. Butler & Valerie Njiiri, Higher Education
Governance: Proposalsfor Model Child Protection Governance Policy, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
367, 375 (2015).
57. GA. CODE ANN. §19-7-5(f).
58. O'Heron v. Blaney, 583 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. 2003); see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 659.
59. See O'Heron, 583 S.E.2d at 836.
60. Id. at 837.
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Act.6 1 There are two exceptions. The first is when the records are
62
necessary for court proceedings related to the allegations of abuse. The
second is when a judge - after a full hearing - approves release of the
records for "legitimate research for educational, scientific, or public
purposes." 63 Even where a judge approves the release of records for
research, the judge may still redact the identifying information of the
reporter."4
The final statute involved in Georgia's mandatory reporting law
concerns legitimate access to child abuse records for government
purposes. 65 The statutes enumerate several instances in which the names
of reporters cannot be disclosed.66 For the purposes of this paper,
confidentiality is not much of a protection. With the hierarchical reporting
structure discussed above, a supervisor is almost guaranteed to know who
made a report. 67 Even if the employee bypasses the internal report and
goes straight to DFACS, the employer may still obtain access to the
reporter's identity. 68
III.

PROTECTION FROM RETALIATION (OR THE LACK THEREOF)

Georgia's mandatory reporting statute does not mention employment
protections. 69 The statute does say that employers cannot "restrain"
reports, which might provide an argument for protection from
retaliation. 70 But Georgia courts do not recognize a public policy
7
exception to at-will employment. 1 Georgia courts consider at-will

61. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(i).
§ 50-18-70 (West 2012).
62. Id. § 19-7-5(i)(1).
63. Id. § 19-7-5(i)(2).
64. Id. § 19-7-5(i)(2)(C).
65. Id. § 49-5-41 (West 2020).
§§ 49-5-41(a)(6)(D),
66. Id.

Georgia's Open Records Act is codified at GA. CODE ANN.

49-5-41(c)(8)(A), 49-549-5-41(a)(7), 49-5-41(c)(7)(A),
41(d)(2)(C).
67. Id. § 19-7-5(c)(2)-(3).
68. See id. § 49-5-41(a)(1) (government entities involved in protection of the child); Id. § 495-41(a)(3) (prosecuting attorneys); Id. § 49-5-41(a)(5)(B) (the school the child attends); Id. § 49-541(a)(9) (law enforcement agencies); Id. § 49-5-41(c)(1) (a treating physician); Id. § 49-5-41(c)(9)
(any mandated reporter with an ongoing relationship with the child); Id. § 49-5-41(c)(10) (school
principal or guidance counselor); Id. § 49-5-41(c)(10.1) (any school official at a school which the
child attends).
69. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5, with ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(g), and S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-7-315(A) (West 2014).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(c)(2)-(3).
71. See, e.g., Seth Eisenberg, Public Officers and Employees - General Provisions, 24 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 309, 309-10 (2007).
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employment to be a fundamental legislative policy of the state because it
is codified in statute. 72 No published cases have examined whether the
prohibition from restraining reports extends to retaliation, but judicial
hostility to implied exceptions to at-will employment lead the author to
conclude that any attempts would likely be unsuccessful. 73
For public employees, it is clear that the mandatory reporting statute
will offer no protection, with one caveat.74 State and local government
entities are protected from lawsuits by sovereign immunity. 75 Immunity
"can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which
specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the
extent of such waiver." 7 6 While no "magic language" is required to waive
immunity, immunity will only be waived when an act from the General
Assembly specifically creates a right of action and provides for money
damages.77 The mandatory reporting law contains neither term, which
eliminates the possibility of a retaliation suit under the statute. 78
However, public employees have one hope private employees do not.
In Georgia, public employees receive the protection of the Georgia
Whistleblower Act (hereinafter "GWA"). 79 Enacted in 1993, the GWA
initially only covered members of the executive branch of the state,
excluding the Governor's Office, but it has since been expanded to cover
all state and local government employees in Georgia.8 0 The GWA waives

72. Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 239-240 (Ga. 2000); GA. CODE ANN.
622 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
73. Reid, 622 S.E.2d at 877.
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(c).
75. See GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX(e); see also Colon v. Fulton Cnty., 751 S.E.2d 307, 310
(Ga. 2013).
76. GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX(e).
77. Colon, 751 S.E.2d at 310.
78. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5.
79. Id. § 45-1-4 (West 2012). Literature on the GWA is divided over what to call the statute,
as no title appears in the body of the act. Compare Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 311 (referring to the
statute as the "Whistleblower Protection Act" and using the acronym "WPA"), with Kimberly J.

§ 34-7-1; see also Reid v. City of Albany,

Doud, Recent Development,: Public Employment: Whistle-Blowers Act: N. Ga. Reg'1 Educ. Serv.
Agency v. Weaver, 527 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. 2000), 30 STETSON L. REv. 1233, 1233 (2001) (referring to

&

the statute as "Georgia's whistleblower statute"), and Murray-Obertein v. Ga. Gov't Transparency
Campaign Fin. Comm'n, 812 S.E.2d 28, 28 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (referring to the statute as the
"Georgia Whistleblower Act" and using the acronym "GWA"). The statute bears the section title
"Complaint or Information From Public Employees as to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in State Programs
and Operations." GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4. Within the practice area, "Georgia Whistleblower Act"
and "GWA" have become the norm.

80. Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 311-13, 316-17; see also H.B. 665, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2005); H.B. 16, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007). The statute was further
amended in 2009 and 2011 to reflect administrative changes to certain administrative agencies in the
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sovereign immunity and provides remedies including reinstatement, back
pay and benefits, and attorney fees. 8 1
The problem with using the GWA is inadequate protection. 82
Because it only covers public employees, it offers no protections for
private employers. 83 Additionally, the GWA will only apply to a narrow
set of facts among public employees. 84 In Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb
HospitalAuthority, a hospital employee learned that her supervisor had
been terminated from her last job for using a "school for medical coders"
to defraud the former employer and steal money. 85 When the supervisor
proposed sending medical coders from the same school at the new
employer, the plaintiff reported what she had learned. 86 The supervisor
was fired, but then rehired. 87 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff was fired,
allegedly for failing a coding test and lacking certification, even though
the plaintiff had passed the test and had certification. 88 The Georgia Court
of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity
89
because no illegal activity had occurred at the currentemployer.
Under Brathwaite, a mandated reporter would only engage in
protected activity if they reported abuse of a minor that was occurring at
the place of employment. 90 A teacher who reports that a parent is likely
abusing a child would not have engaged in protected activity under the
GWA, and there would be no protection from retaliation.9 1 If our goal is
to protect reporters, the GWA is not an effective mechanism to do so.

state. See H.B. 642, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 97, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2009).
81. Colon, 751 S.E.2d at 310; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(e)-(f).
82. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(e)-(f). To prevent the discussion of the GWA from consuming
the entire paper, this paper will not detail the elements of a GWA claim. The only relevant element
to this discussion is "protected activity," which deals with the scope of reports that are protected. Id.
83. Id. § 45-1-4(a)(3).
84. See Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 729 S.E.2d 625, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 627.
88. Id. at 627-28.
89. Id. at 628-29.
90. Id. at 628-29.
91. But see Albers v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 522-524
(Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a campus police officer did engage in protected activity when he
objected to university officials attempting to interfere in an investigation and get charges against a
student dropped, which could constitute obstruction of justice). Because the mandatory reporting
statute prohibits employers from controlling or modifying reports, an objection to any interference
would likely constitute protected activity. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(e)(2)-(3) (West 2019).
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In addition to the GWA, public school teachers have one additional
hope, the Fair Dismissal Act ( hereinafter "FDA"). 92 The FDA grants
what are commonly referred to as "tenure" rights to public school teachers
upon the acceptance of each teachers fourth consecutive yearly contract
with the same school district.93 If the teacher leaves for another school
district after achieving tenure, the teacher is tenured again upon receiving
a second contract.9 4 Once a teacher receives tenure, the teacher can only
be removed for one of eight enumerated reasons, which are:
(1) Incompetency;
(2) Insubordination;
(3) Willful neglect of duties;
(4) Immorality;
(5) Inciting, encouraging, or counseling students to violate any valid
state law, municipal ordinance, or policy or rule of the local board of
education;
(6) To reduce staff due to loss of students or cancellation of programs
and due to no fault or performance issue of the teacher, administrator,
or other employee. In the event that a teacher, administrator, or other
employee is terminated or suspended pursuant to this paragraph, the
local unit of administration shall specify in writing to such teacher,
administrator, or other employee that the termination or suspension is
due to no fault or performance issues of such teacher, administrator, or
other employee;
(7) Failure to secure and maintain necessary educational training; or
95
(8) Any other good and sufficient cause.

The FDA also lays out detailed notice and procedural requirements,
including hearings and appellate reviews by the local board of education,

92. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-940 (West 2013).
93. See id. § 20-2-942(b)(1) (West 2015); see also Moulder v. Bartow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 599
S.E.2d 495, 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-942(b)(4).
95. Id. § 20-2-940(a).
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the state board of education, and state courts. 96 The notice and procedural
requirements are strictly enforced, and failure or refusal to comply results
in the reversal of a teacher's termination.97 By specifically enumerating
the reasons for which a teacher may be terminated, the FDA could, in
theory, help stop a teacher from being terminated in retaliation for a report
of child abuse. As a practical matter, however, the FDA does not provide
effective protection for teachers.
The first reason the FDA is not an effective bar on retaliation is its
limited scope. 98 The FDA only protects public school teachers who have
achieved tenure. 99 If a teacher is promoted to an administrative or
supervisory position, the FDA does not protect the teacher from being
retaliated against, so long as the retaliation is limited to demotion back to
being a teacher.100 The FDA only protects teachers who work for a local
board of education. Therefore, private school teachers are not covered,
and state teachers101 are likely not covered.102 Charter school teachers,
and teachers at charter districts, are also not covered.103
The second reason that the FDA provides inadequate protection is
that it is not designed to protect teachers from retaliation.1 04 While the
GWA allows an employee to provide evidence that the employer's alleged

96. Id. §§ 20-2-942(b)(2), 20-2-943.
97. See, e.g., Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Wilmer, 753 S.E.2d 459, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
98. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Butler, 763 S.E.2d 473, 474 (Ga. 2014).
99. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-942(b)(1).
100. Id. § 20-2-942(d). The FDA was amended in 1995 to stop protecting administrators and
supervisors. DeKalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 763 S.E.2d at 474; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-942(c). If the
administrator or supervisor achieved tenure first, however, the administratoror supervisor is protected
from termination but not demotion. DeKalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 763 S.E.2d at 475; GA. CODE ANN. § 202-942(d).
101. Georgia maintains three K-12 state schools: the Atlanta Area School for the Deaf, the
Georgia School for the Deaf, and the Georgia Academy for the Blind. State Schools, GA. DEP'T OF
https://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/State-Schools/Pages
EDUC.,
/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-942(a)(1). A Westlaw search of cases citing the FDA and including
the terms "blind" or "deaf' did not illuminate whether state schools are officially excluded from
coverage, and the FDA does state, "[t]his part shall apply to boards of education of all public school
systems in this state." Id. § 20-2-946. But the plain language of the statute does not include state
schools, and the policies governing state schools do not include a dismissal procedure. See State
Schools, supra note 101. Additionally, at least one policy mentions immediate dismissal of teachers,
which implies that the FDA's procedural requirements do not apply to state schools. GA. DEPT. OF
EDUC., SS-3002, REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CHARGES/FINGERPRINTING/CRIMINAL

BACKGROUND

CHECKS, STATE SCHOOLS, at 2 (2002).
103. Day v. Floyd Coty. Bd. of Educ., 775 S.E.2d 622, 624, 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
104. See generally GA. CODE ANN. §20-2-940 (West 2013) (does not state that an employee may
provide evidence that the employer's alleged reason for termination is a pretext for retaliation).
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reason for termination is merely pretext for retaliation, 105 the FDA does
Evidence of pretext can be excluded altogether from
not. 106
consideration.1 07 Appellate review by the state board and the courts use
the "any evidence" rule, meaning that the local board's decision must be
upheld if there is any evidence supporting the assertion of the school
district. 108 This means that the sole debate is whether the charges against
the teacher are supported by any evidence, not whether there is an ulterior
motive for the charges.
IV.

OPTIONS FOR AMENDMENT

Assuming that we wish to protect mandated reporters, 0 9 the question
becomes how best to accomplish this goal. The most comprehensive
solution, amending the mandatory reporter statute to provide a private
right of action with robust remedies," 0 may be difficult to get enacted in
light of Georgia's strong policy against employment protections,
particularly in the private sphere."I To evaluate options for amendment,
two questions must be answered. First, where would protection go?
Second, what enforcement mechanism would be used? Certain answers
to the first question would dictate the answer to the second question. This
paper will first look at where protection could be placed, and then look to
other U.S. jurisdictions for an evaluation of what language could be used
to create an enforcement mechanism if a new one is added to the mandated
reporter statute specifically.
A.

Where Protection Could Go

There are three intuitive places the General Assembly could place
employment protection, depending on the width of coverage legislators

105. Forrester v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 708 S.E.2d 660, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Harris
v. City of Atlanta, 813 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
106. Dukes-Walton v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 784 S.E.2d 37, 43-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 176; Moulder v. Bartow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d 495, 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004);
Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. v. Wardlow, 784 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
109. Although this is by no means a guarantee, there are many reasons to protect those who
report illegal activity.

See, e.g., Symposium, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of

WhistleblowerProtection,51 ADMIN. L. REv. 581, 586-87 (1999).
110. The author assumes that development of a general public policy exception to at-will
employment and wrongful discharge claim is simply not viable. See supra p. 9.
111. See, e.g., Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 240 (Ga. 2000); GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-7-1; see also Reid v. City of Albany, 622 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
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can accept.1 2 These locations are: the Fair Employment Practices Act
(hereinafter "FEPA"), 1 3 the GWA,114 or the mandatory reporting
statute." 5 Each has a different purpose and scope.
The FEPA originally sought to bring an anti-discrimination
The FEPA established the
mechanism to public employment.'
Commission on Equal Opportunity and set forth an administrative hearing
and remedies process for public employees." 7 The FEPA allows limited
civil remedies, including reinstatement with back pay and benefits, but it
only awards limited attorney fees if a court has to enforce the
administrative award.1 " The FEPA also allows a civil fine of up to $1,000

to be levied.' 19
Although the FEPA is geared towards combatting discrimination, the
General Assembly tacked on an overtime requirement and reference to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA"). 120 The partial adoption
of the FLSA on the state level into the FEPA indicated a general desire to
incorporate the FLSA's overtime compensation requirement for public
employees. 121 It may have also signaled an intent for public employee
overtime claims to be handled through the FEPA's administrative process,
though the section incorporating the overtime compensation requirement
was not included in the list of "unlawful practices" which must go to an
administrator.122 If the General Assembly wished to cover only public
employees, including leveraging a small civil fine and limited civil
remedies, the FEPA would be an appropriate location for amendment.
The second option is to amend the GWA. As discussed above, the
GWA grants a private right of action with broad civil remedies to public
If the General Assembly wished to limit protection to
employees."2
public employees but grant broad remedies, the GWA would be the best

112. See infra p. 16; see also infra p. 17.
113. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-20 (West 2020).
114. Id. § 45-1-4 (West 2012).
115. Id. § 19-7-5(a) (West 2019).
116. See id. § 45-19-21(a)(2-3).
117. Id. §§ 45-19-23(a)-(b), 45-19-36.
118. Id. §§ 45-19-38(c)-(d), 45-19-39(c).
119. Id. § 45-19-44(b).
120. Id. § 45-19-46. The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 201.
121. See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-46 (stating that certain public employee overtime provisions
operate "pursuant to" or are explicitly "authorized by" the Fair Labor Standards Act).
122. See id. § 45-19-29 (defining unlawful practices); Id. § 45-19-36(b) (stating that claims
regarding unlawful practices are filed through the administrative process).
123. Id. § 45-1-4(e)(1).
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location to do so. The General Assembly could also overrule Brathwaite
and help in other instances as well, but that is a topic for another paper.
The final option is to amend the mandatory reporter statute. This
would cover all mandated reporters, and it could potentially cover
permissive reporters, who are also authorized to report via the same
statute. 124 Because there is no remedy provided, the General Assembly
could craft its own.12 1 It could grant limited civil remedies with a civil
fine like the FEPA.1 26 It could grant broad civil remedies like the GWA.1 27
Or the General Assembly could simply extend the criminal sanctions for
failing to report to any act of retaliation.1 28
B.

What Other States Usefor Enforcement Mechanisms

For an idea of what solutions are politically realistic, we can look to
other states and territories. The author conducted a state and territory
survey covering all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.1 29 The author was unable to
124. Id. § 19-7-5(d).
125. See generally id. § 19-7-5 (containing no specific civil remedy for mandatory reporters
punished for reporting abuse).
126. As discussed infra, the author surveyed 54 jurisdictions across the United States. See infra
note 131 and accompanying text. Connecticut is the only surveyed jurisdiction that has embraced
anything similar to this option. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101e(a) (West 2018). Connecticut allows
the Attorney General to bring an action for a civil fine of not more than $2,500, with a possibility of
equitable relief. Id.; see also Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport, 43 A3d 69, 89-90 (Conn. 2012).
127. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(e).
128. Id. § 45-1-4(d).
129. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.17.020 (West 2019); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-204 (West 2013); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11166 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17a-10le(a) (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (West 2017); D.C. CODE ANN. § 41321.02 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (West 2019); 19
GUAM CODE ANN. § 13201 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-1.1 (West 2020); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 16-1605 (West 2020); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 3133-5-2 (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.73A (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2224 (West
2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (West 2020); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603 (2019); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A(h) (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704(a)(1) (West
2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4017 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West 2016);
MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (West 2019); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.115(3) (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (West 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B301 (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-25.1-09.1 (West 2020); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28711 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169C:29 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.13 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (West 2019); N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 413(c) (McKinney 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101(B)(5) (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.010 (West 2013); 23 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT ANN. § 6320 (West 2014); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 450 (2003); 11 R.I. GEN.
ANN. § 40-11-6 (West 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3
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survey American Samoa or the Northern Mariana Islands. 130 Of the 54
jurisdictions surveyed (including Georgia), 32 did not have employment
protection built into their mandated reporter statutes. 131 Many of these
jurisdictions, however, allow a broad public policy wrongful discharge or
retaliatory discharge cause of action.132
Twelve jurisdictions expressly authorize a private cause of action
within the mandated reporter statute. 133 Within these twelve jurisdictions,
two offer additional sanctions. Minnesota provides for a statutory civil
fine in addition to standard civil remedies.13 ' North Dakota provides for
criminal sanctions for those who retaliate, in addition to a civil cause of
action against the employer. 135
Four jurisdictions provide for criminal sanctions against those who
retaliate and do not have a cause of action within the mandated reporter

(2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410(b) (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.110 (West
2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913(0(2) (West 2015);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2533 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (West 2021); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-803 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981(2)(e) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205(c) (West 2020).
130. See sources cited supra note 129.
131. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.17.020 (West 2019); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620
(2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West 2020);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (West 2017); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1321.02 (West 2019); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.201 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (West 2019); tit. 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 13201
(2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-1.1 (West 2020); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1605 (West 2020);
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-2 (West 2017); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (West 2020); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-704(a)(1) (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West 2016); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-353 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28711 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (West 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-301 (West 2016);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.010 (West 2013); 11
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-6 (West 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-4a-403 (2020); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2533 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (West
2021); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-2-803 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West
2019).
132. Madelaine Cleghorn et al., Employment DiscriminationAgainst LGBT Persons, 19 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 367, 389 n.155 (2018) (citing Paul H. Tobias, State-By-State Compendium of Leading
and Representative Decisions Concerning the Public Policy Tort Doctrine, 1 LIT. WRONG.

DISCHARGE CLAIMS app. 5A (Dec. 2017)).
133. IOWA CODE § 232.73A (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A(h) (West
2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.13 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 50-25.1-09.1 (West 2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IOA, § 1-2-101(B)(5) (West 2019); 23 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT ANN. § 6320 (West 2014); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 450 (2003); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-7-315 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410(b) (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 261.110 (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913(f)(2) (West 2015).
134. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, Subdiv. 4a(b).
135. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-25.1-09.1(1).
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statute.1 36 Connecticut stands alone in setting a civil fine without a private
cause of action.137 Four jurisdictions specifically prohibit retaliation
against mandated reporters but are silent as to the enforcement

mechanism.138
In the spirit of being politically realistic (and keeping this article a
manageable size), the paper will analyze the statutory language used by
Georgia's three neighbors with protection built into their mandated
reporter statutes: Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina.1 39 The
analysis will focus on what should happen if the Georgia General
Assembly adopted the same or similar language.
Alabama Code Section 26-14-3(g) provides, "[c]ommencing on
August 1, 2013, a public or private employer who discharges, suspends,
disciplines, or penalizes an employee solely for reporting suspected child
abuse or neglect pursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class C
misdemeanor." 14 0 As an initial matter, Georgia does not have classes of
misdemeanors, so "Class C misdemeanor" would be changed to
"misdemeanor."" If Georgia adopted this language and did not specify
a different punishment, a supervisor who terminates an employee in
retaliation for reporting child abuse would face a potential fine of up to
$1,000, a prison sentence of up to twelve months, or both. 4 2 No civil
cause of action would be implied because Georgia does not allow implied
private rights of action from penal statutes."3'
If Georgia imposed criminal sanctions for retaliation without a civil
cause of action, there would still be a problem for mandated reporters who
suffer retaliation: they would not have any true remedy."4 If a teacher is
terminated for reporting child abuse, the superintendent - and possibly
some members of the school board - might face misdemeanor charges at
the discretion of the district attorney, but there would be no way for the
teacher to get their job back, no way to receive compensation for lost

136. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(g) (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-204(b) (2013); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-2224(b) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205(c) (west 2020).
137. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-10le(a) (West 2018); see also Perez-Dickson v. City of
Bridgeport, 43 A.3d 69, 90 (Conn. 2012).
138. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4017 (2019); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (west 2018);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413.1(c) (McKinney 2020); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2)(e) (West 2020).
139. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(g); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1-410(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315.
140. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(g).
141. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(a) (West 2016).
142. See id. § 17-10-3(a)(1).
143. See id. § 9-2-8(a) (West 2010); Somerville v. White, 787 S.E.2d 350, 352 (Ga. Ct. App.
2016).
144. See Somerville, 787 S.E.2d at 352-53.
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wages and benefits, and no way to clear the termination off their record. 4 5
Criminal sanctions might deter the retaliation, but they might not. And if
they do not, the teacher has no means of obtaining relief.14 6
Tennessee Code Section 37-1-410(b) provides, "[a]ny person
reporting under this part shall have a civil cause of action against any
person who causes a detrimental change in the employment status of the
reporting party by reason of the report." 14 To begin, there is no required
edit that would need to happen in order for this language to be put into the
But "detrimental change" is not used regarding
Georgia Code.
employment status anywhere in the Georgia Code. 148 Legislators might
consider borrowing from the GWA definition of "retaliation," which is:
"Retaliate" or "retaliation" refers to the discharge, suspension, or
demotion by a public employer of a public employee or any other
adverse employment action taken by a public employer against a public
employee in the terms or conditions of employment for disclosing a
violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a
supervisor or government agency. 149

Additionally, the phrase "any person" could be a problem, assuming
the cause of action would not be against the supervisor specifically.
Georgia's labor code defines employer as "any person or entity that
employs one or more employees and shall include the State of Georgia
and its political subdivisions and instrumentalities." 50
If legislators borrowed the appropriate language and placed it in the
mandated reporter statute, the definition of "employer" would be placed
in Section (b), and the anti-retaliation provision would read, "[a]ny person
reporting under this part shall have a civil cause of action against an
employer who causes the person to be discharged, suspended, demoted,
or to suffer any other adverse employment action in the terms or

145. Id.
146. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-2-8(a); Somerville, 787 S.E.2d at 352-53 (indicating the lack of a
private right of action).
147. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410(b) (West 2010).
148. A Westlaw search of the Georgia Code for the phrase "detrimental change" returned two
results. The first was in the Notes of Decisions for GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1501 (West 2003), which
concerns registration of foreign businesses. The second was in the Notes of Decisions for GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-14-29 (West 2013), which is Georgia's equitable estoppel statute. The phrase "detrimental
change" does not appear in the statutory text of the Georgia Code. See also, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 142-1501 (West 2003), 24-14-29 (West 2013).
149. See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(a)(5) (West 2012).
150. Id. § 34-1-7(a)(3) (West 2020).
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conditions of the person's employment by reason of the report." 51 This
language would be more consistent with other portions of the Georgia
Code that deal with employment. 12 But it would still have one significant
problem: it does not set forth remedies." 3
By failing to specify remedies, Tennessee's language would only
operate against private employers in Georgia.1 4 In a lawsuit against a
private employer, the rule is "[flor every right there shall be a remedy;
every court having jurisdiction of the one may, if necessary, frame the
other." 55 A court could craft a remedy, which may include reinstatement,
back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, etc. 156 The author would be
concerned about placing the decision of remedies into the hands of courts
that are traditionally hostile to employment claims, but private employees
would have a remedy.15 Public employees, however, would not.' 58
Public employers would claim sovereign immunity.' 59 Immunity
"can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which
specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the
extent of such waiver."160 Without an express remedy provided by the
legislature, sovereign immunity would not be waived.' 6 ' Unless the GWA
was independently amended, public employees would be left without a
remedy, and public employers would suffer no legal consequences for
retaliation if Tennessee's approach was adopted in Georgia.16 2
South Carolina Code Section 63-7-315 reads:
(A) An employer must not dismiss, demote, suspend, or otherwise
discipline or discriminate against an employee who is required or
permitted to report child abuse or neglect pursuant to Section 63-7310 based on the fact that the employee has made a report of child abuse
or neglect.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
IX(e).

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410(b) (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(a)(5).
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(e)(1-2).
See id. § 19-7-5 (West 2019).
See id. §§ 9-2-3 (West 2020), 45-19-36 (West 2020).
Id. § 9-2-3.
See id. §§ 45-1-4(e-f), 45-19-38(c-d), 45-19-39(c).
Id. § 45-19-39(c).
See id. § 9-2-3; Id. § 9-2-8(a) (West 2010).
GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX(e).
Id.
See Colon v. Fulton Cnty., 751 S.E.2d 307, 310 (Ga. 2013).
Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410(b) (West 2010), with GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

21

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
22

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:1

(B) An employee who is adversely affected by conduct that is in
violation of subsection (A) may bring a civil action for reinstatement
and back pay. An action brought pursuant to this subsection may be
commenced against an employer, including the State, a political
subdivision of the State, and an office, department, independent agency,
authority, institution, association, or other body in state government. An
action brought pursuant to this subsection must be commenced within
three years of the date the adverse personnel action occurred.
(C) In an action brought pursuant to subsection (B), the court may award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party; however, in order for
the employer to receive reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to this
subsection, the court must make a finding pursuant to Section 63-7-2000
that:
(1) the employee made a report of suspected child abuse or neglect
maliciously or in bad faith; or
(2) the employee is guilty of making a false report of suspected child
abuse or neglect pursuant to Section 63-7-440.163

As an initial matter, the references to other portions of the mandated
reporter statute would have to be changed before the text could be
incorporated into the Georgia statute. Otherwise, the language in the
South Carolina statute should result in all reporters - mandatory or
permissive - receiving protection.1 64 The one bit of language that could
be changed is "political subdivision of the State" in subsection (B). 165
While this language is commonly understood to mean county and
municipal governments, the Georgia General Assembly has shown a
preference for different language in the past. 166
The GWA initially only covered members of the Executive Branch
of the state, excluding the Governor's Office, but it was amended to cover
all state and local government employees. 167 The language chosen was
"or any local or regional governmental entity that receives any funds from
the State of Georgia."168 This choice of language is unequivocal in
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315 (West 2014).
164. See id. (providing express remedies to public employees in the form of reinstatement and
back pay, the statute prevents public employers from claiming sovereign immunity, and thereby
permits all reporters to file retaliation lawsuits against employers).
165. Id. § 63-7-315(B).
166. See infra notes 167-169.
167. See Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 311-12.
168. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(a)(4) (West 2012).
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covering local entities, which would be preferable given the hostility of
Georgia courts. 169
The South Carolina statute limits remedies to reinstatement and
backpay, with the possibility of attorney fees.' 7 0 This is significantly less
than the GWA, which allows injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay
and benefits, compensatory damages, and attorney fees.' It is, however,
still better than the FEPA, which grants reinstatement with back pay and
benefits, but only allows attorney fees if a court is required to enforce the
administrative order.1'72 One pro-employer edit that may be necessary
would be to shorten the statute of limitations.' 7 3 While the South Carolina
statute has a three-year statute of limitations, the GWA has a one-year
limit with a three-year statute of ultimate repose,'4 and the FEPA has a
180-day filing deadline.'" Adopting the GWA statute of limitations and
statute of ultimate repose would bring the South Carolina language more
in line with other areas of Georgia law.' 76
With the above edits, the South Carolina statute would protect
anyone who makes a good faith report of suspected child abuse from
employment retaliation, even permissive reporters.' 7 7 A private right of
action would allow employees to vindicate their own rights or settle
matters without court involvement.' 7 8 If the Georgia General Assembly

169. See Forrester v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 708 S.E.2d 660, 666-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
("public employer" requirement satisfied where agreed by parties); but see Brathwaite v. Fulton-

DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 729 S.E.2d 625, 630 (Ga, Ct. App. 2012) (placing burden on employee and
showing default rule in favor of employer).

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315(B)-(C) (West 2014).
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(e)-(f).
Id. §§ 45-19-38(c)-(d) (West 2020), 45-19-39(c) (West 2020).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315(B) (West 2014); but see GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN. §45-1-4(e)(1).
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-36(b).

§ 45-1-4(e)(1).

176. See, e.g., id. § 34-5-5 (stating a one-year statute of limitations for instituting a civil action
for the collection of unpaid wages); Id. § 45-1.-4(e)(1) (stating a one-year statute of limitations for

instituting a civil action for retaliation following a whistleblower claim); Id.

§ 45-19-36(b)

(stating a

180-day statute of limitations for instituting a civil action after an alleged unlawful employment
practice occurs).

177. See S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 63-7-315

(West 2014) (providing protections for public and private

mandated reporters against retaliation from their employers).

178.

See generally S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 63-7-315

(allowing employees who face retaliation from

their employers after making a mandated child abuse report to bring a civil action for reinstatement
and back pay); TENN. CODE § 37-1-410(b) (West 2010) (allowing employees who face retaliation to
bring a civil action against those who make a detrimental change in the employee's employment status
following the mandated report).
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decided to protect those who protect children, the South Carolina
17 9
language would provide a good start.
CONCLUSION

Mandated reporters in Georgia are in a tough spot. They are required
1 80
However,
to report potential child abuse, on pain of criminal sanctions.
there is virtually no protection for these reporters if their employer has
181
This is a
some connection to the abuser and retaliates against them.
Assembly
General
the
Ideally,
problem which should be addressed.
would take a stance that is protective of those who seek to protect children
and amend the mandatory reporter statute to include a private right of
action with broad civil remedies such as reinstatement with back pay and
benefits, compensatory damages, attorney fees, costs, and expenses of
litigation.' 82 If there is political resistance to this option, there are
83
alternatives, including criminal sanctions for retaliation.'
Other U.S. jurisdictions provide a myriad of inspirations for
84
But the
language to use in amending the mandated reporter statute.'
Georgia General Assembly would not need to look far for inspiration.
Alabama has a concise criminal statute penalizing retaliation that could
85
South Carolina has a comprehensive
be adopted with little editing.1
option for creating a civil cause of action that would provide a good start,
but it would need editing before being added to the Georgia mandated
reporter statute.1 86 Either of these states can provide Georgia legislators
with a starting point to amend the mandated reporter statute and protect
those who report child abuse or neglect.

179. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315 (providing a civil cause of action for employees
who face retaliation from employers after making a mandated child abuse report).
180. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(h) (West 2019).
181. Compare GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-7-5, with ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(g) (West 2020), and S.C.
CODE ANN. § 63-7-315.
182. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315.
183. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(g).
184.

See supra Part IV.B.

185.
186.

ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(g).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-315.
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